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 Detecting contingency relationships between causal events allows us to adapt to 
and control these events. However, research has shown age-related impairments in this 
ability. The goal of this study was to examine how reduced processing speed in older 
adults affects contingency learning. Manipulating the time during which to generate the 
response, to test the limited time mechanism of processing speed, had little effect on 
contingency judgments. Varying the temporal contiguity of events, to test the 
simultaneity mechanism of processing speed, affected young adults’ contingency 
judgments. Older adults’ judgments were less accurate overall, and young adults’ 
judgments were similarly less accurate when there was less temporal contiguity of events. 
These findings lend support for a processing speed theory of contingency learning. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
The literature on cognitive aging provides considerable evidence that old age is 
associated with decline in an array of cognitive abilities. Among these age-related 
cognitive impairments is an apparent decline in the ability to learn relationships between 
causal events in the environment (e.g., Mutter & Pliske, 1996). Because humans rely on 
such capabilities to adaptively predict, explain, and control the events they encounter 
(Alloy & Tabachnick, 1984), and because the environment changes continuously, this 
ability remains essential even in the later years of life. Psychological research can provide 
a greater understanding of cognitive aging processes so that age-related changes can be 
better accommodated. Indeed, by providing a greater understanding of this aspect of 
cognition, psychologists may not only help older adults distinguish normal changes in 
cognition from those that are abnormal, but they may also increase the general 
understanding of normal human cognition, thereby improving standards of living for all 
age groups. 
In an attempt to identify potential reasons for a decline in contingency learning 
ability, research has indicated slowed processing speed. Indeed, a large amount of 
research has documented an age-related decline in processing speed (e.g., Birren, 1974). 
Furthermore, research has shown an empirical link between processing speed and 
associative learning, with slower processing speed yielding impaired associative learning 
ability (Fisk & Warr, 1996; Kyllonen et al., 1991; Salthouse, 1994b). In addition to these 
findings, research has found that associative learning ability is related to contingency 
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learning accuracy (e.g., Rescorla, 1972; Shanks, 1987). Taken as a whole, these findings 
suggest that there is also a link between processing speed and contingency learning. 
Interestingly, the few studies examining this link have shown that constraining processing 
time and decreasing temporal contiguity of causal events reduces contingency judgment 
accuracy in young and older adults (e.g., Parr & Mercier, 1998). 
Taking these findings into consideration, the current study further examined how 
age-related reductions in processing speed affect contingency judgment accuracy. With 
the integration of a processing speed theory of associative learning (Salthouse, 1996) and 
associative learning theories of contingency learning (Shanks, 1987; Wagner, 1981), the 
impact of processing speed mechanisms on contingency judgment accuracy were 
investigated. Specifically, the timing characteristics of the contingency judgment task 
were manipulated to examine the differential impact of the limited time and simultaneity 
mechanisms of processing speed (i.e., Salthouse, 1996) on contingency judgments. The 
limited time mechanism was tested by altering how much time both younger and older 
adults had to generate a response (generation time). It was hypothesized that participants 
with slower processing speed would be differentially taxed when given a short time to 
process the first event, resulting in less accurate contingency judgments. However, the 
opposite was predicted of participants that are provided a longer response generation 
time. The simultaneity mechanism was tested by manipulating the length of time between 
the response and outcome events (memory time). It was expected that participants with 
slower processing speed would be less able to maintain the memory activation for the 
first event through rehearsal over a longer response-outcome interval but that all 
participants would be able to associate the two events with a short response-outcome 
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interval, because the event representations overlap more easily in working memory. 
Because older adults generally have slower processing speed, it was specifically expected 
that contingency judgment accuracy would be more dramatically reduced in older adults 
than younger adults in situations in which they were especially bound by time 
constraints—when they had less time to process the causal events and when there was 
less temporal contiguity of the events. 
 
  
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
Contingency Learning 
Definition of Contingency Learning 
Contingency learning involves the detection and retention of relationships 
between co-occurring events in the environment. Contingencies are ever-present in our 
daily surroundings and are involved in judgments ranging from everyday social 
interactions to complex medical diagnoses. Judgments of contingency underlie 
prediction, explanation, and control over events (Alloy & Tabachnick, 1984) and are 
therefore essential to many behaviors, such as learning, categorization, and hypothesis 
testing (Crocker, 1981). Thus, contingency learning is central not only to the regulation 
and understanding of events in what may otherwise seem a senseless world but also to the 
adaptation of the self to new environmental events.  
The focus of many contingency judgment studies has been on causal learning. 
Some of these studies have involved passive observation of probabilistic causal 
relationships present in the environment; others have involved behavioral control of 
contingent relationships. This distinction is commonly labeled cue-outcome (C-O) versus 
response-outcome (R-O) contingency learning. Although both C-O and R-O contingency 
learning enable us to predict and explain occurrences of outcome events, R-O learning is 
unique in that one’s behavior is or is not causing the outcome, so predictive learning can 
be facilitated through one’s own behavior. Both C-O and R-O contingency judgments 
4 
5 
have been studied extensively in young adults (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1980), but there has 
been little aging research in either of these areas, especially R-O contingency learning.  
Contingency is defined statistically in terms of the ∆P rule—the difference 
between the conditional probability of an outcome given a cue or response and the 
conditional probability of an outcome given no cue or response: ∆P = P(O/CR) – 
P(O/~CR). Proponents of a rule-based explanation of contingency judgment claim that 
humans “compute” ∆P when making judgments of contingency (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 
1980; Wasserman, Chatlosh, & Neunaber, 1983). The conditional probabilities are 
obtained from the frequencies of four possible cue or response/outcome combinations 
(see Figure 1). The probability of an outcome, given a cue or response has occurred, 
would be computed as the number of times an outcome occurred when the cue or 
response occurred (cell A), divided by the total number of times the cue or response event 
had occurred (cell A plus cell B): P(O/CR) = (A/ A+B). Similarly, the probability of an 
outcome when no cue or response has occurred is computed by the number of times the 
outcome occurred in the absence of the cue or response (cell C) divided by the total 
number of times no cue or response occurred (cell C plus cell D): P(O/~CR) = (C/ C+D). 
 
               Outcome 
 O ~O 
CR A B 
 
Cue or 
Response 
~CR C D 
Figure 1. CR-O Contingency Table. 
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The contingency between two events may be anything between positive and 
negative 1.0.  When an outcome is more likely in the presence of a cue or response, or 
when the cue or response causes the outcome, the contingency between the events is 
positive. When the outcome is more likely in the absence of a cue or response, or when 
the cue or response inhibits the outcome, the contingency is negative. When there is no 
relationship between the cue or response and outcome events, the contingency is zero.  
Research on R-O Contingency Learning in Young Adults 
A number of studies have focused on R-O contingency learning in young adults, 
showing that young adults learn causal contingencies with remarkable accuracy (e.g., 
Allen & Jenkins, 1980; Chatlosh, Neunaber, & Wasserman, 1985; Wasserman, Chatlosh, 
& Neunaber, 1983; Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh, & Baker, 1993). For example, Chatlosh, 
Neunaber, and Wasserman (1985, Experiment 1) used nine contingency problems, 
computed from all possible combinations of .875, .50, and .125 conditional probabilities, 
and asked participants to rate an R-O relation of the extent to which pressing a telegraph 
key caused a white light to flash. They found that 98% of the variance in young adults’ 
contingency judgments was accounted for by a linear trend of actual contingency.  
Other studies on contingency learning in young adults have highlighted some 
learning conditions that reduce the accuracy of young adults’ contingency judgment 
performance. Of particular interest to the present study, researchers have found a 
decrease in judged contingency as the time between response and outcome is increased 
(e.g., Shanks & Dickinson, 1991; Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989, Experiment 2). 
For example, to test the sensitivity of causality judgments to temporal contiguity, 
Dickinson and Shanks (1985) used a video game in which participants did or did not fire 
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a shell (response) and a tank did or did not explode after traversing a minefield 
(outcome). P(O/R) was considered how effective the shell was or how dense the 
minefield was, whereas P(O/~R) reflected only differences in how dense the minefield 
was. P(O/R) was always set at .75, and P(O/~R) varied between .75 and .25. They 
examined an immediate condition in which firing the shell caused an explosion 
immediately (250 ms) while the tank was still crossing the minefield, a delayed condition 
in which firing the shell caused an explosion after the tank traversed the entire minefield 
and would have disappeared from sight anyway (700 ms), and a random condition in 
which the tank exploded at a randomly determined time as it traversed the screen. In all 
conditions, if the shell was not fired, the tank exploded at a randomly determined time 
according to the conditional probability of an outcome given no response. As expected, 
contingency judgment accuracy was significantly higher in the immediate condition than 
in the delayed and random conditions, which did not differ, lending support for the 
importance of event contiguity for causal contingency judgment.  
 
Associative Processes in Contingency Learning 
Although contingency judgments may involve computations based on learned 
frequencies of events (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1980), contingency detection may also be 
explained by a simpler associative learning mechanism that dynamically updates 
associative strength between two co-occurring events (e.g., Rescorla, 1985). According to 
associative learning theories, associative learning is a connective mechanism that links 
initially disparate entities or events (Rescorla, 1985). For associative learning to occur, 
stimulus and response representations must be simultaneously activated in working 
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memory (i.e., Frensch & Miner, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Wagner, 1981). Research has 
shown that associative learning depends on influences such as prior experience (Kausler, 
1994), stimulus intensity (e.g., Finkbiner & Woodruff-Pak, 1991), and spatial or temporal 
contiguity of events (Finkbiner & Woodruff-Pak, 1991; Sloman, 1996). Because 
contingency learning may be explained by the associative learning paradigm, it is useful 
to survey the basic mechanisms of associative learning and how these have been applied 
to contingency learning.  
Rescorla-Wagner Model 
The Rescorla-Wagner (1972) theory of classical conditioning suggests that when 
events co-occur, an association is formed between the representations of the events in 
memory (Rescorla, 1985). The theory explains the learning processes in Pavlovian 
conditioning but can also be applied to instrumental learning (Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 
1995; Rescorla, 1985). This model represents changes in the associative strength of a 
target stimulus by the equation ∆V = α β (λ – V), where α is a constant related to the 
salience of this stimulus, β is a constant related to the salience of the outcome, λ is the 
asymptote or maximum amount of associative learning the outcome will support, and V 
is the total amount of associative strength accrued to the target stimulus going into a 
particular trial (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). In early learning trials, V will be small, 
making λ – V large and the resulting change in associative strength (∆V) large. Over 
subsequent learning trials, when V has become increasingly stronger and thus closer to 
asymptote, ∆V will become smaller and will begin to level off (Rescorla & Wagner, 
1972). As such, the Rescorla-Wagner theory of classical conditioning accounts for 
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changes in the rate of learning over multiple trials (i.e., the typical learning curve; e.g., 
Shanks, 1987). 
According to this model, two associations are acquired during the process of 
associative learning: (1) an association between a compound stimulus—representing the 
target stimulus together with the background context and the outcome (VBT), and (2) an 
association between the background context alone and the outcome (VB) (Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972). In other words, when a target response occurs, it is encoded along with 
the context of the experimental situation in which it occurs; when a response does not 
occur, the background context alone is encoded. Rescorla and Wagner (1972) 
conceptualized the associative strength of the compound stimulus (VBT) as related to the 
strength of its component parts (VBT  = VB  + VT). Thus, the amount of associative 
strength that can accrue to the target depends on the strength of the association between 
the background and outcome. If the background alone does not reliably predict the 
outcome, the associative strength of the target response will be high; if the background by 
itself reliably predicts the outcome, the associative strength of the target response will be 
low. Hence, in a positive contingency, the outcome is more likely to happen when the 
response target and background are present together (strong VBT) and is less likely to 
occur when the background occurs alone (weak VB), yielding heightened associative 
strength with the target. Conversely, in a negative contingency, the outcome is more 
likely to result when the target stimulus is absent and the background occurs alone. In this 
case, accrual of associative strength to the target response is blocked, and the R-O 
association is weakened because the background is a better predictor of the outcome 
(Rescorla, 1985).  
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Shanks’ Jt Model 
Shanks’ (1987) Jt model applied the principles of the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) 
model of classical conditioning to human contingency learning and judgment and is 
currently regarded as the most accurate account of causal contingency detection in 
humans (Mutter & Williams, 2004). Like the Rescorla-Wagner model, Shanks (1987) 
posited that a series of contingency learning trials allows two associations to be formed: 
(1) an association between the target plus the background and the outcome (Vbt) and (2) 
an association between the background alone and the outcome (Vb). Hence, as the 
formula Jt = Vbt – Vb illustrates, judgments of causality (Jt) are based on an assessment of 
the difference in strength between these two associations. Shanks’ model, like the 
Rescorla-Wagner theory, holds that the strengths of the Vbt and Vb associations are 
affected by learning rate or salience parameters (a and b) and the asymptote (λ) of 
associative strength that can be supported: ∆Vb = ab b (λ – Vb) and ∆Vbt = abt b (λ – Vbt). 
Thus, this model predicts that judgments of causality will decrease when the contingency 
is reduced, because the difference between Vbt and Vb will decrease as a consequence of 
the increase in associative strength between the outcome and the background (Vb). 
As Dickinson and Shanks (1985) note, this associative model of contingency 
learning combines advantages of conditioning theory and the ∆P rule; indeed, at first 
glance the equations appear equivalent. After all, the probability of an outcome given a 
response, P(O/R), is essentially the same as the associative strength held between the 
target plus background and the outcome, or Vbt. Likewise, the probability of an outcome 
given no response, P(O/~R), is similar to the associative strength held between the 
background alone and the outcome, Vb. And ∆P and Jt are computed by subtracting the 
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two. But while the component parts mean essentially the same thing, their constitutions 
are quite different. As defined previously, P(O/R) and P(O/~R) are conditional 
probabilities computed from relative cell frequencies in a contingency table. In contrast, 
Vb and Vbt change over trials as a function of additional learning rate parameters. Thus, Jt, 
unlike ∆P, takes into account how the strength of association changes with amount of 
training. Furthermore, in contrast to the objective ∆P rule, the Jt rule implies a selective 
attribution process that is modulated by the information about the causal context that is 
present whenever the target operates. Qualitatively, the associative model describes 
causal knowledge as being derived from competing associations between the 
representations of the events, whereas the ∆P approach describes people as acquiring and 
comparing mental representations of two conditional probabilities (Shanks, 1987). 
Interestingly, Shanks (1987) concluded that the associative explanation of contingency 
learning actually does not require any mental representation of ‘contingency’ at all, since 
it is actually the degree of associative strength between the two events that is reflected in 
a causality judgment. 
Wagner’s SOP Model 
By providing information about how associative learning processes might operate 
from a cognitive viewpoint, Wagner’s (1981) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 
theory also extends the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) theory. Wagner (1981) suggested SOP 
as a set of standard operating procedures in memory. According to this theory, memory 
nodes operate in different states of activation (A1, A2, or I), and associative learning 
depends on which nodes are highly activated in working memory. Nodes in the A1 state 
of activation are most important to associative learning, because the A1 state is the 
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highest level of sensory activation in working memory, induced by stimulus onset and 
representing stimuli in focal attention. Nodes in the A2 state represent stimuli in working 
memory but not in focal attention. Generally, A2 activation follows A1 activation; 
however, the presentation of a stimulus can also lead to A2 activations in the 
representations of associated stimuli. Nodes in an I, or inactive, state represent 
information that has been stored in long-term memory yet has not been retrieved into 
working memory. 
Using Wagner’s (1981) terminology to describe causal learning, the presentation 
of a causal stimulus results in an A1 state of memory activation for the representation of 
that event in working memory. In the depiction shown in Figure 2, the upward slope 
corresponds to the processing of the event into focal attention, with the peak representing 
full A1 activation of the representation. Incidentally, A1 activation may be prolonged 
through rehearsal, as depicted by the plateau of the graph. Depending on how much the 
event is rehearsed, the activation eventually decays, as shown by the downward slope. 
When the outcome event occurs, its representation is also activated into an A1 state of 
activation. The A1 activation of the outcome stimulus representation could occur during 
one of three temporal locations in relation to the causal stimulus: (a) before this stimulus 
has been fully processed, (b) during the A1 activation of this stimulus, or (c) after the A1 
activation of this stimulus has begun to decay. An association between the two events is 
formed only when the A1 activations of the causal and outcome events overlap in 
working memory, and the strongest association is made when the overlapping A1 peaks 
are at their highest levels. 
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Figure 2. (a) A1 Activation Curve.  
    (b) Possible temporal locations of outcome event representation in   
          relation to causal event representation. 
(a) 
(b) 
A1 activation causal event 
 
A1 activation outcome event 
Research Support for Associative Learning Theory 
The associative learning theory has shown a remarkable ability to predict and 
explain a wide variety of contingency learning data (e.g., Mackintosh, 1983, as cited in 
Rescorla, 1985; Rescorla, 1972; Wasserman et al., 1993). Shanks (1987), using a 
procedure similar to Chatlosh and colleagues (1985), tested both rule-based and 
associative models of contingency judgment acquisition by comparing actual contingency 
judgment data with simulated contingency judgments based on the respective models. 
The actual contingency judgment data followed growth functions, with positive 
contingency judgments increasing and negative judgments decreasing over trials. This 
overall acquisition pattern did not correspond to predictions based on the rule-based 
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models. Since the ∆P rule involves computing contingency based on mental 
representations of conditional probabilities, it assumes that contingency estimates will be 
accurate after only a few learning trials. In fact, the mathematical calculations should be 
even more accurate with fewer trials, because it should be easier to remember how many 
times the outcome occurred with and without the response. In contrast, the associative 
model incorporates the idea that conditional probability estimates should regress toward 
the actual probabilities as more information is acquired (Shanks, 1987). Furthermore, the 
associative model allows for the acquisition of information about compound cues, which 
in this case would be the target response in addition to the background, as information 
about the context conveys whether the target is in fact an informative predictor of the 
outcome. In contrast, the ∆P rule does not account for learning situations with multiple 
cues (Dickinson & Shanks, 1985). Shanks (1987) concluded that the associative model, 
because it more accurately accounted for the observed patterns of contingency learning, 
provides the best account of contingency learning and judgment. 
Shanks’ (1987) associative learning model can also explain the reduced accuracy 
of contingency judgments that typically accompanies decreased temporal contiguity. As 
described previously, Dickinson and Shanks (1985) asked young adult participants to 
judge how effectively firing a shell caused a tank to explode, manipulating the amount of 
time between firing the shell and the explosion of a tank. To further explore the 
associative learning model, Dickinson and Shanks (1985) created mean contingency 
ratings and mean values of associative strength (Jt) of 500 simulated subjects under the 
same temporal conditions as the actual participants in their contingency task. Simulated 
judgments, as predicted by this simple Jt model, were similar to actual subject judgments 
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in their experiment. Because the temporal contiguity of the target and outcome events 
influenced the accuracy of contingency estimates, they concluded that the associative 
model indeed illustrates a way learning might be influenced by variations in the temporal 
relations between events. In contrast, a rule-based approach does not clearly explain why 
varying the time between events should affect the operations involved in computing 
contingency judgments (Dickinson & Shanks, 1985). 
 
Age, Associative Processes, and Contingency Learning 
Contingency Learning and Aging 
Although many studies have explored young adults’ ability to detect causal 
relationships in the environment, fewer studies have examined older adults’ ability to 
judge contingency. However, the studies that do exist show that although older adults can 
perceive contingent relationships in the environment, there is an age-related decline in 
this ability. Specifically, compared to young adults, older adults tend to underestimate 
contingency (e.g., Parr & Mercier, 1998), are less able to detect weak as opposed to 
salient contingencies (e.g., Mutter & Williams, 2004), show less accurate contingency 
judgments in situations requiring higher memory demand (Mutter & Pliske, 1996), and 
are less able to perceive negative contingencies (e.g., Chasseigne, Mullet, & Stewart, 
1997; Mutter & Williams, 2004). Additionally, older adults seem to be less able to make 
explicit judgments of contingency than to adapt their responses to changing 
environmental contingencies (e.g., Mutter & Williams, 2004).  
As noted previously, research provides substantial support for a link between 
associative learning capability and contingency judgment accuracy. The implication is 
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that contingency learning will be reduced if associative learning processes are impaired 
(Mutter & Williams, 2004). Moreover, there is considerable evidence that older adults 
show impairment in associative learning, lending support for an associative learning 
theory of impaired contingency learning in older adults.  
Age and Associative Learning 
Simple measures of associative learning involve learning stimulus-response (S-R) 
pairs. In the realm of cognitive aging, associative learning is frequently measured by the 
paired-associate learning (PAL) task, involving intentional learning and recall of 
stimulus-response pairs over many trials (Kausler, 1994). Associative learning is also 
assessed in Pavlovian conditioning paradigms, such as eyeblink classical conditioning 
studies (e.g., Woodruff-Pak & Thompson, 1988). Other associative learning tasks involve 
pairing symbols (e.g., Conditional Associative Learning—Levine, Stuss, & Milberg, 
1997; Salthouse, 1994b) or learning number-symbol relationships (e.g., Salthouse, 
1994b). 
 Research has shown that associative learning is impaired by age (e.g., Hertzog et 
al., 2002). For example, paired associate learning studies show that older adults are less 
accurate than young adults after both single and multiple learning trials (Donlosky & 
Connor, 1997). Compared to young adults, older adults have more difficulty learning new 
associations (see Kausler, 1994), are slower and less accurate to respond to previously 
seen S-R pairs (Spieler & Balota, 1996), and are more apt to perseverate responses in 
previously learned S-R pairs to learning with a new R (see Kausler, 1994). Furthermore, 
increasing age may be associated with a more rapid loss of associative information over 
very short intervals (Salthouse, 1994b). Corroborating results have been found in 
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associative learning studies with eyeblink classical conditioning (Finkbiner & Woodruff-
Pak, 1991; Woodruff-Pak & Jaeger, 1998; Woodruff-Pak & Thompson, 1988). The age-
related decline in classical conditioning was found in both delay conditioning (Woodruff-
Pak & Thompson, 1988) and in trace conditioning (Finkbiner and Woodruff-Pak, 1991, 
Experiment 2) when the period between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli varied 
between 400 and 1800 milliseconds. Interestingly, Mutter and Williams (2004) found that 
older adults’ contingency detection was related to their performance on a nonverbal 
associative learning task (Conditional Associative Learning—Levine, Stuss, & Milberg, 
1997), providing empirical evidence for an associative learning link to contingency 
learning in aging research in keeping with the link evidenced in studies with young adults 
(e.g., Dickinson & Shanks, 1985).   
Age and Processing Speed 
Salthouse (1994b) has suggested that slower processing speed in older adults is a 
key contributor to age-related decline in associative learning. Speed of processing refers 
to the swiftness with which cognitive operations are performed (Salthouse, 1996) and is 
generally measured in terms of the speed of executing elementary operations, including 
encoding, elaboration, search, rehearsal, retrieval, integration, or abstraction of 
information accessible in working memory (Lindenberger, Mayr, & Kliegl, 1993). 
Importantly, because the success of these operations depends on the information available 
in working memory, if the information is displaced or decays more quickly over time the 
operations will be less effective (Salthouse, 1996).  
In fact, numerous studies have documented a negative relationship between age 
and performance on a wide range of information-processing tasks (e.g., Cunningham, 
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1989; Hertzog, 1989; Lindenberger et al., 1993; Salthouse, 1996), and perceptual slowing 
is widely cited as a main reason for this age-related decline (Lindenberger et al., 1993; 
Salthouse, 1996). For example, Salthouse (1994b) found that increased age was 
associated with slower encoding and response processes on the digit-symbol test of 
perceptual speed, as well as with slower search of the code table and longer time to 
decide to search the code table. Birren (1965, as cited in Birren, 1974) demonstrated a 
link between speed and memory when he found intercorrelations between speed and 
memory measures increased with older adults. For young adults, the correlation between 
the Wechsler Memory Scale and speed of copying digits was not significantly different 
from zero (-.01), whereas for older adults a significant correlation of .52 was obtained. 
Bryan and Luszcz (1996) found that scores on a measure of processing speed mediated 
age-related variance in a working memory task, indicating speed as a limit to cognitive 
capacities such as working memory.  
Still other studies have shown a reduction in the correlation between age and 
ability on many cognitive tasks after statistically controlling for speed (e.g., Lindenberger 
et al., 1993). In addition, age-related influences on many cognitive measures are 
attenuated after controlling for measures of speed (e.g., Salthouse, 1996; Lindenberger et 
al., 1993). For example, Schaie (1990) found that age-ability correlations on measures of 
verbal comprehension, spatial orientation, inductive reasoning, number, and word fluency 
were reduced after controlling for differences in speed. Similarly, Hertzog (1989) found a 
significant negative linear age trend for all measured intellectual abilities, of which only 
one to three percent of the total variance was explainable by linear and quadratic trends 
of age after controlling for speed. For most measures, commonality analyses 
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demonstrated substantial age-related variance associated with speed (e.g., 86% in spatial 
relations; 89% in induction). Similarly, Salthouse (1993b) found variance associated with 
age in a wide range of cognitive variables was reduced from a mean of 16.2% to 3.6% 
when measures of processing speed were held constant. Thus, processing speed may be 
seen as a key age-associated process, both affecting and constraining cognitive abilities 
(e.g., Salthouse & Babcock, 1991; Lindenberger et al., 1993).  
However, processing speed is but one element of an intricate system of cognitive 
structures (Kail & Salthouse, 1994), and some researchers therefore caution against its 
portrayal as the ultimate source of cognitive aging (e.g., Lindenberger et al., 1993). For 
example, potential mediators of the age-cognition relationship include reduced attention 
(e.g., Stanken, 1988, as cited in Salthouse, 1994a), failure of inhibition (e.g., Hasher & 
Zacks, 1988, as cited in Salthouse, 1994a), and working memory capacity (e.g., 
Lindenberger et al., 1993; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). Regardless of other potential 
age-related mediators, processing speed has, nonetheless, shown unique and widespread 
influence on cognitive tasks and therefore warrants further consideration.  
Processing Speed and Associative Learning 
Associative learning is one cognitive ability empirically proven to be negatively 
impacted by slower processing speed. For example, while studying individual differences 
in young adults, Kyllonen, Tirre, and Christal (1991), found that speed of memory search 
predicted associative learning with a short study time (i.e., .5 sec, 1 sec) and that the 
relationship was attenuated when study time increased (i.e., 4 sec, 8 sec). Moreover, Fisk 
and Warr (1996) found that age-related variance in their associative learning task was 
reduced by 75% when controlling for the effects of perceptual speed. Similarly, Salthouse 
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(1994b) found that the influence of age on associative memory was particularly 
accounted for by variance due to processing speed for shorter stimulus presentation 
times. To explain this finding, he concluded that speed is a mediator between age and 
associative memory, in that increased age is related to slower processing speed which is 
in turn related to less accurate associative memory.  
Based on his findings, Salthouse (1994b) began to theorize as to why processing 
speed might impact associative learning. He suggested that slower processing might have 
resulted in insufficient encoding, leading to failure to retain the information between 
presentations or trials and thus to less accurate associative learning. More specifically, 
Salthouse (1996) proposed that processing speed impacts associative learning by 
influencing two fundamental cognitive resources: (1) the amount of time needed to 
perform cognitive operations and (2) the capacity to coordinate different sources of 
information. Salthouse termed the operations impacting these resources the limited time 
and simultaneity mechanisms of processing speed. These mechanisms essentially imply 
that, if information is not simultaneously available in working memory within certain 
time constraints, associative learning will be negatively impacted. 
To clarify further, the limited time mechanism specifies that if information is not 
fully processed within a limited amount of time, relevant cognitive operations will be 
incomplete. Thus, in order to effectively encode two stimuli together in working memory, 
a person must have enough time to fully process the first stimulus before a second occurs. 
Otherwise, encoded information from the first will be fragile and the association with the 
second poorly constructed. Salthouse (1996) compared the limited time mechanism to an 
assembly line—if component parts of a task are not fully processed, later operations can 
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only be partially completed, and the final products will be impaired. Faster processing 
speed means less time is needed to complete cognitive operations, so slower processors 
need more time to complete a task as well as faster processors. In this sense, reducing the 
time constraints for a cognitive task should lead to less disparity in performance between 
fast and slow processors. Accordingly, the limited time mechanism is relevant primarily 
when there are restrictions on time available for processing, such as external time limits 
or concurrent demands on processing (Salthouse, 1996).  
Several studies have confirmed the role of the limited time mechanism in older 
adults by showing that reducing time constraints also reduces age differences in cognitive 
task performance (e.g., Canestrari, 1963; Monge & Hultsch, 1971). For example, in one 
of the earliest studies published on the effects of aging and speed on intelligence, Lorge 
(1936, as cited in Cunningham, 1989) administered three intelligence tests with varied 
speed demands and found that the highly speeded test produced more pronounced age 
differences than the least speeded test with liberal time limits. He interpreted these results 
as demonstrating that the observed age-induced perceptual slowing simply meant more 
time was needed to perform the necessary information-processing steps, leading to the 
apparent performance deficit in speeded measures. Concordantly, perception studies (e.g., 
Kline, 1972, as cited in Birren, 1974) have shown that older adults needed longer 
stimulus presentation times in order for the initial or target stimulus to even be perceived.  
Even though allowing additional time to process information can help older 
adults’ performance on many cognitive tasks, the precise impact on processing speed is 
not always fully evident with the alleviation of time constraints. Rate of processing also 
affects the quality of the subsuming operations (Salthouse, 1994a). Birren (1974) likened 
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perceptual slowing to an electrical brown-out, during which many electrical appliances in 
the home run more slowly as a result of a voltage drop. Like the encumbrance of 
electrical activities in the home, central cognitive slowing results in slowed behavior. But 
slowness itself would not be the only deficit—the appliances’ functions would also be 
inadequate. In cognition, slowing affects functions such as perception, encoding, and 
retrieval from long-term memory, contributing to a decreased likelihood of novel 
associations (Birren, 1974). Further, because associative learning requires that stimuli are 
simultaneously available in working memory (Salthouse, 1996), processing information 
slowly can lead to less information taken in and effectively synchronized at one time.  
Salthouse (1996) called the ability to coordinate the necessary components of an 
operation the simultaneity mechanism. Faster synchronization allows better quality of the 
resulting operation because more information can be processed in a shorter amount of 
time, which in turn allows more information to be simultaneously represented and 
enriched for subsequent, higher level processing. Faster processing also permits more 
rehearsal, so that information from earlier events may be more repeatedly cycled in 
working memory and thus remain available concurrently with new information presented 
later in time. Conversely, slower processing could mean information is more easily lost 
(Myerson et. al., 1990), particularly if events are spread out in time. Salthouse (1996) 
likened the simultaneity mechanism to juggling. As with any other complex activity, 
juggling requires the harmonization of constituent tasks—the faster one can “juggle” the 
many parts of a single task, the better synchronized these parts will be. Taken in light of 
the earlier assembly line analogy, the simultaneity mechanism could be also viewed as 
the ability to add additional useful pieces to an item during its time at an assembly 
 
 23
 
 
station, where every subsequent station adds more substance, and the final product is 
strengthened accordingly.  
There is empirical evidence that slower processing does indeed impact the quality, 
not just the speed, of resulting cognitive performance. For example, Rabinowitz (1989) 
found that, when young and older adults were given unlimited time to study a list of 
words, free recall performance in both age groups improved compared to a timed 
condition, but the young adults’ improvement was greater than that of the older adults. 
Rabinowitz suggested that older adults may have used less optimal elaborative memory 
strategies or may have used their strategies less efficiently than younger adults. Bryan 
and Luszcz (1996) found that, compared to older adults, young adults showed 
differentially greater recall of words after three rehearsals than one, showing that 
additional time did not help older adults perform comparably to younger adults. 
Moreover, the relationship between age and free recall was mediated by task-independent 
processing speed. Salthouse (1994b) found older adults made less accurate decisions and 
took more time to reach and communicate the decisions on computer associative learning 
tasks, even when they were given no time restrictions and accuracy was emphasized. 
Based on these findings, Salthouse suggested that the older adults had weaker 
representations of the stimuli to be learned, because slower processing impeded rehearsal 
and caused less effective encoding or elaboration. Salthouse (1991) found similar results 
in many measures, such that substantial age-related differences persisted even when 
external time limits were removed. 
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Processing Speed and Contingency Learning 
The link between processing speed and associative learning may also be extended 
to contingency learning, as processing speed impacts associative learning, which in turn 
affects contingency learning. There are few studies directly examining a connection 
between processing speed and contingency learning, yet considerable evidence supports 
the theory that the ability to quickly process events aids the learning of a contingency 
between these events. Specifically, studies have found that older and younger adults are 
affected differentially by altering the timing characteristics in contingency judgment 
tasks, suggesting that the differences are largely due to slower processing speed in the 
older adults (e.g., Mercier & Parr, 1996). Other studies, while not implicating processing 
speed directly, provide additional evidence for the effects of event timing on contingency 
learning, showing that increased time constraints can reduce contingency judgment 
accuracy, even in young adults (e.g., Shanks & Dickinson, 1991; Shanks et al., 1989).  
For example, Mercier and Parr (1996) attempted to stress the processing 
efficiency of their young adult participants by forcing the cognitive processes involved in 
acquiring and maintaining contingency information to operate faster. They manipulated 
stimulus duration (50 or 200 ms) and intertrial interval (ITI; 50, 200, or 1000 ms) and 
examined participants’ estimates of positive, negative, and zero contingencies (+50, –50, 
and 0). They used a contingency task in which participants were asked to judge the 
efficacy of a tank’s camouflage by watching as camouflaged and un-camouflaged tanks 
either exploded or did not explode when entering a field with visually guided landmines. 
The results confirmed that the participants could discriminate contingencies, although 
they underestimated the absolute value of negative contingencies slightly more than 
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positive contingencies. Additionally, time pressure from shorter stimulus durations and 
shorter ITIs markedly decreased accuracy of the judgments. 
Parr and Mercier (1998, Experiment 1) extended these findings by stressing the 
processing abilities of both older and young adult groups with constrained contingency 
judgment task timing characteristics. Using a similar video game task, they asked 
participants to judge the relative efficacy of tank camouflage in protecting against 
explosion from visually guided mines. They again manipulated stimulus duration (100 or 
300 ms) and ITIs (100, 300, or 1000 ms), and they examined weak to strong positive 
contingencies (.27, .50, or .80). The results showed that increased time constraints (i.e., 
shorter stimulus duration and ITI) reduced contingency judgment accuracy for both 
young and older adults, although the detriment was greater for older adults’ judgments. 
Beyond this, increasing the ITI (Experiment 1) reduced age differences—although older 
adults were less accurate than younger adults at the short (100 ms) ITI, there were no 
significant age differences at the longer ITIs (300 and 1000 ms).  
Mutter and Williams (2004) also attempted to find reduced age differences in 
contingency learning, by providing additional processing time and more learning trials. 
Using a variant of a task designed by Hammond (1980) and used in several young adult 
contingency learning studies (e.g., Dickinson & Shanks, 1985; Wasserman et al. 1983; 
Chatlosh et al., 1985), they asked older and younger adults to determine the relationship 
between pressing a response key (R) and the outcome (O) of a flashing triangle. The 
accuracy of their R-O contingency estimates was examined after three learning 
conditions: 60 learning trials with a maximum 1-second R-O interval (SI-60), 60 learning 
trials with a maximum 4-second R-O interval (LI-60), and 240 learning trials with a 
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maximum 1-second R-O interval (SI-240). Across conditions, older adults showed poorer 
discrimination of both positive and negative contingencies than young adults but were 
especially inaccurate for negative contingencies. Age differences were similar in both the 
SI-60 and SI-240 conditions, showing that older adults did not differentially benefit from 
additional learning trials. However, age differences were reduced with a longer R-O 
interval, although surprisingly not because of improvement in the older adults’ 
judgments. Rather, the accuracy of the young adults’ contingency estimates declined with 
increased sampling time, a finding inconsistent with similar previous studies (i.e., 
Chatlosh et al., 1995, Experiment 1; Wasserman et al., 1983, Experiment 1). The authors 
speculated that the task design could have confounded the longer R-O condition, because 
young participants made substantially more responses when given a longer sampling 
time. Without cues indicating the beginning and end of these time intervals, it may have 
been difficult to judge the actual R-O relationships—young adults may have misjudged 
contingencies simply because they paired temporally contingent events (and non-events) 
instead of the events that were actually contingent. Thus, even though the results 
outwardly showed smaller age differences in contingency judgments when participants 
were given more time to process event information, the limitations of this type of task 
prevent inferences about the impact of reducing processing time constraints. Therefore, in 
order to more closely examine the effects of age and processing time on contingency 
judgment accuracy, there is a need for research that allows more experimental control of 
the R-O interval across a range of contingency types (i.e., positive, negative, weak, and 
salient).  
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Current Study 
The goal of the current study was to further understand the processes that might 
impact contingency learning by examining the effects of the limited time and 
simultaneity mechanisms of processing speed (i.e., Salthouse, 1996) on contingency 
judgment accuracy. The current study also sought to add more control to the R-O 
contingency judgment task as well as to examine a range of contingency problem types. 
Processing Speed Mechanisms and SOP 
The hypotheses for this study were based on an integration of Salthouse’s (1996) 
processing speed theory and Wagner’s (1981) SOP model of associative learning. In 
seeking to explain what processes affect contingency learning, previous research has 
supported associative learning theories (e.g., Shanks, 1987), suggesting that hindering 
associative learning directly impairs contingency learning (e.g., Mutter & Williams, 
2004). One way associative learning could be impaired is by slowed processing speed, as 
processing speed has been shown to be a mediator between age and associative learning 
(Salthouse, 1994b). Based on this, it is reasonable to hypothesize that slowed processing 
speed is likewise a determinant of impaired contingency learning (See Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Age  Processing 
Speed 
  Associative  
  Learning 
  Contingency    
   Learning 
Figure 3. An integrative theory: Effects of age on contingency learning, as 
mediated by processing speed and associative learning. 
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When explaining the limited time mechanism, Salthouse (1996) stated that there 
must be sufficient time for the first stimulus to be processed before the second occurs, or 
the relevant operations will not be successfully executed. Likewise, Wagner (1981) 
posited that the best associative learning occurs if the A1 activation states for both events 
overlap at their highest peaks. Thus, by this view the most optimal associative learning 
situation exists when a person has had enough time to process the first stimulus by the 
time the second occurs. Conversely, if the outcome event occurs before one has had time 
to fully process the first event, A1 overlap will be lower, and the degree of association 
will be little to none (see Figure 4).  
                           
Figure 4. The limited time mechanism and SOP. 
 
In SOP terms, the simultaneity mechanism involves the ability to coordinate, or 
‘juggle,’ the A1 activation states for multiple events. In other words, the A1 activation 
states for the events must, again, overlap in order for the association to be made, and the 
simultaneity mechanism involves how well one is able to keep the event representations 
active in working memory over time in order to associate them. One way to maintain A1 
activation is through rehearsal. The optimal learning situation, in regards to the 
simultaneity mechanism, would be one in which there is little need for rehearsal, because 
the A1 states of both events occur simultaneously. This is the case when an outcome 
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immediately follows a response. Importantly, the first event should also be fully activated 
before the second occurs (limited time mechanism). A less optimal condition involves the 
outcome event occurrence some time after the first event. In order for the A1 
representations to occur simultaneously, the A1 for the first event must be maintained 
through rehearsal (see Figure 5).  
 
       
Figure 5. The simultaneity mechanism and SOP. 
 
The actual interval between response and outcome could lead to different overlaps 
in A1 activation states for different people, depending on their processing speed 
limitations. In other words, the exact moment in time an event occurs in the environment 
is not necessarily the same moment the event is represented in working memory—there is 
a period of time before a stimulus’ A1 activation reaches peak, and this latency varies 
among individuals depending on their processing speed. Thus, consistent timing of 
external events can still lead to inconsistent performance between individuals, because 
different people process information at different rates. Moreover, as mentioned 
previously, both speed of activation in memory and quality of learned association can be 
affected. In a basic sense then, one’s internal processing capability should be optimally 
matched to the external timing of events in order for associative learning to be at its best. 
What this means is that, if environmental events occur more quickly than they can be 
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processed, or if events do not occur close enough together in time, associative learning 
will be impaired. Because increased age is related to slower processing, reducing the time 
to process co-occurring events should cause especially poor associative learning for older 
adults. Similarly, requiring extra rehearsal in order to keep co-occurring events in a state 
of simultaneous activation should be more difficult for older adults and impair associative 
learning (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Age Implications. 
 
A1 activation causal event 
 
A1 activation outcome event 
 
Task Timing Manipulations and Contingency Judgment 
 
The current study investigated the impact of processing speed on young and older 
adults’ R-O contingency judgment by manipulating timing characteristics of a 
contingency judgment task. In a specific attempt to correct for the limitations present in 
Mutter and Williams’ (2004) study, the beginning and end of each trial were clearly 
delineated, and young and older participants were required to respond (or not respond) 
only once within both short and long sampling periods. In order to test the limited time 
mechanism, the amount of time available to generate a response (TG) was varied. It was 
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hypothesized that individuals with slower processing speed would be taxed with a short 
TG but fully able to process the first event with a longer TG. In order to test the 
simultaneity mechanism, the length of time the representation of the first event must be 
held in memory (TM) was manipulated by varying the interval between the response and 
outcome. It was hypothesized that a long interval required greater rehearsal of the 
representation of the first event to maintain a state of A1 memory activation until the 
outcome event occurred. Thus, individuals with slower processing speed should have 
more difficulty maintaining an A1 state of activation for the response in a long R-O 
interval but should have a high A1 state of activation for the response in a short R-O 
interval. The various combinations of the short and long timings composed four 
conditions: TG-Short/TM-Short (SS), TG-Short/TM-Long (SL), TG-Long/TM-Short (LS), 
and TG-Long/TM-Long (LL) (See Figure 7).  
  
  TG 
 
  Short  
 
Long 
Short (Delay) 
 SS LS 
TM
Long (Trace) 
 SL LL 
 
Figure 7. Experimental Conditions. 
 
Compared to young adults, it was expected that older adults would make less 
accurate contingency judgments overall, especially for negative contingencies (cf. Mutter 
& Williams, 2004). It was specifically expected that older adults would show differential 
impairment from an increased impact of the limited time and simultaneity mechanisms 
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for event pairs, compared to young adults. Beyond this, it was hypothesized that 
contingency judgments would be less accurate in the less optimal short generation time 
(TG) and long memory time (TM) conditions than in the long TG and short TM conditions. 
Furthermore, it was expected that contingency judgments would be least accurate in the 
TG-short/TM-long (SL) condition and most accurate in the TG-long/TM-short (LS) 
condition. Finally, age differences were expected to be magnified in these non-optimal 
timing conditions.
 
  
Chapter Three 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight young (39 female) adults, ages 18-26 (M = 19.9; SD = 1.86), and 48 
older adults (33 female), ages 61-91 (M = 70.6; SD = 7.45) participated in this study. 
Four additional participants served as pilot subjects (1 older). Two older participants 
were excluded from analyses due to failure to comply with experiment instructions, and 
one younger participant did not finish the task due to scheduling difficulties. Young 
adults were recruited from introductory psychology classes and received course credit 
and a small monetary stipend for their participation. Older adults were recruited from the 
community via mass mailings and advertisements and were paid a monetary stipend for 
their participation. Biographical data (age, race, gender, socioeconomic status, years of 
education, and marital status), as well as measures of basic health and cognitive ability 
(verbal knowledge, verbal fluency, perceptual speed, working memory executive 
functioning, and associative learning) were collected for both groups. Participants who 
reported current use of medications known to affect cognitive ability or who suffered 
from neurological or psychological impairment were excluded from the study. All 
participants were reportedly in good health for their age group.  
Design and Materials 
A 2 (Age: Young vs. Older) x 2 (Generation Time TG: 750 ms vs. 2250 ms) x 2 
(Memory Time TM: 1000 ms vs. 4000 ms) x 9 (Contingency: .875/.875, .875/.50, 
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.875/.125, .50/.50, .50/.125, .50/.875, .125/.125, .125/.875, .125/.50) mixed factorial 
design with repeated measures on contingency was used.  
The generation of the response (TG) occurred within either a 750 or 2250 ms 
period (see Appendix B). The short time was based on an associative learning study by 
Salthouse (1994b), in which he found young adults learned associations at close to 90 
percent correct at a 750 ms stimulus presentation time, and their learning remained 
maximized at this level, even with greater stimulus presentation time (1000 ms). Older 
adults’ associative learning was only close to 70 percent at the 750 ms stimulus 
presentation time and continued to rise, nearing 75 percent at 1000 ms. Salthouse (1994b) 
suggested that “the average adult over age 60 would not be able to engage in more 
extensive processing with stimulus presentation times of less than 1000 ms” (p. 1502). 
When given no time constraints, older adults self-paced an average of 1500 ms per 
stimulus presentation (Salthouse, 1994b). Based on Salthouse’s (1994b) study, the 
current study sought to provide sufficient processing time for both young and older adults 
by raising the longer response generation time to 2250 ms. 
 The outcome (TM) occurred either immediately (1000 ms) or after 4000 ms. The 
short TM condition supposedly created little need for rehearsal, regardless of processing 
speed. The long TM condition was patterned after that of Mutter and Williams (2004) and 
was expected to be a sufficient amount of time for fast processors to maintain the 
memory representation of the first stimulus but problematic for slower processors. The 
outcome occurred for 500 ms in all conditions. The inter-trial interval was fixed at 1000 
ms, to promote processing of the outcome event before the next trial began. 
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Contingency problems were administered in an order determined by a software 
randomization routine. Because outcome probability has been found to produce 
overestimation of contingency judgments in younger adults (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1980; 
Jenkins & Ward, 1965), the contingency design was fully balanced with the three 
conditional probabilities (see Appendix A). The contingency for each problem was 
computed using the formula ∆ = P(Outcome/Response) - P(Outcome/~Response). Values 
of P(O/R) and P(O/~R) were .125, .500, and .875, and problem contingencies were 
created by combining the values of these probabilities (e.g., .125/.875, etc.). Thus, 
participants judged nine problems, with three non-contingencies, one positive and one 
negative strong contingency (0.75), and two positive and two negative weak 
contingencies (0.375).  
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in two sessions on different days lasting 
approximately two hours each, with breaks given halfway through each session and as 
needed. All testing was conducted in the Cognition Laboratory or similar experimental 
room. Some tasks were completed on a Macintosh computer and some using a pencil and 
paper.  
Participants first completed an informed consent form and a demographic and 
health questionnaire. Before any testing began, participants were given an opportunity to 
ask questions or voice concerns. They then completed the experimental task and several 
measures from a larger protocol that assesses general cognitive ability. These tests 
included standardized and unstandardized measures of processing speed [i.e., Pattern 
Comparison (Salthouse, 1994a); WAIS-III Digit Symbol (Wechsler, 1997)], associative 
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learning [i.e., Conditional Associative Learning (e.g., Levine, Stuss, & Milberg, 1997; 
Salthouse, 1994b)], working memory executive functioning [i.e., Reading Span 
(Salthouse & Babcock, 1991)], and verbal knowledge [i.e., Mill Hill Vocabulary, WAIS-
III Information (Wechsler, 1997)]. 
The experimental task was run on a Macintosh PowerPC. Participants were first 
shown the experiment instructions. These instructions directed them to determine 
whether pressing the spacebar on the computer keyboard (response) had any effect on 
whether a triangle flashed (outcome). They were told that, in order to learn the 
relationship, they must sometimes press the spacebar and sometimes not press the 
spacebar (See Appendix A). After reading the instructions, any questions were answered, 
and a set of 10 practice trials began, programmed with a noncontingent relationship with 
two conditional probabilities equal to .500. Participants saw a white background screen 
and a black outline of an equilateral triangle with 1-inch sides. At the beginning of each 
trial, the generation time period (TG) was signaled by a small row of boxes on the bottom 
of the screen, which emptied sequentially until the generation time ran out. Participants 
were instructed that they must choose to press or not press the spacebar during this period 
of time. Then there was a period of memory time (TM), after which the triangle either 
flashed, from white to black to white, or did not flash at all. If a response was made 
during the generation time, the outcome occurred based on the programmed contingency 
according to P(O/R); if a response was not made, the outcome occurred based on the 
programmed contingency according to P(O/~R). One second later, a new trial began.  
After 60 trials, participants were asked to estimate the contingency between the 
button press and the triangle flash. Contingency judgments were made by typing in a 
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number from –100 to +100. The numerical end- and midpoints of the scale were marked 
with such verbal indicators of the strength of the relationships as “strongly causes,” 
“strongly prevents,” and “no relationship.” Thus, a perfect positive contingency was 
denoted as +100 (i.e., pressing the response key always caused the triangle to flash), a 
perfect negative contingency as –100 (i.e., pressing the key always prevented the triangle 
from flashing), and a non-contingent relationship as 0 (i.e., there was no relationship 
between the response and outcome events).  
After estimating the overall contingency, participants were instructed to make 
conditional probability estimates of the relationship between pressing or not pressing the 
button press and the triangle flashing. They first estimated the probability that the triangle 
would flash when the key was pressed and then judged the probability that the triangle 
would flash when the key was not pressed. To respond, they typed their choice ranging 
from 0% to 100%, with 100% indicating that the triangle would always flash, 0% 
indicating that the triangle definitely would not flash, and 50% indicating that the triangle 
would flash about half the time when the key was pressed and about half the time when it 
was not pressed. After making their judgments, participants began the next contingency 
problem. 
After completing the second session, participants were debriefed, given the 
opportunity to ask questions, and compensated for their time.
 
  
Chapter Four 
Results 
 
Participant Characteristics 
 To ensure that age differences in basic cognitive ability were consistent across 
conditions, a 2 (Age) x 2 (TG) x 2 (TM) MANOVA was conducted for the measures of 
processing speed, working memory executive functioning, associative learning, and 
verbal knowledge. Age was the only significant effect in this analysis [Age, F(6, 61) = 
19.69, η2 = .66; TG, F(6, 61) < 1, η2 = .04; TM, F(6, 61) < 1, η2 = .03; Age x TG, F(6, 61) 
= 1.24, η2 = .11; Age x TM, F(6, 61) < 1, η2 = .04; Age x TG x TM, F(6, 61) < 1, η2 = .01]. 
Follow-up univariate tests were conducted for these age differences, collapsed across 
condition. These data are shown in Table 1. Young adults scored higher than older adults 
on measures of processing speed, WM executive functioning, and associative learning. 
Older adults scored higher than young adults on measures of verbal knowledge. Thus, 
age differences in these basic cognitive abilities followed the typical pattern shown in the 
cognitive aging literature (see Mutter & Williams, 2004). 
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Table 1 
 
Participant Characteristics for Young and Older Adults 
 
  
Young 
 
Older 
 
 
Processing Speed 
 
     Digit Symbol* 
 
     Pattern Comparison* 
 
 
 
 
84.11 (2.47) 
 
56.91 (1.54) 
 
 
 
 
61.90 (2.34) 
 
43.82 (1.46) 
WM Executive Function 
 
     Reading Span* 
 
 
 
2.71 (.19) 
 
 
2.05 (.18) 
Associative Learning 
 
     CAL Retained Response* 
 
 
 
23.57 (1.55) 
 
 
15.36 (1.47) 
Verbal Knowledge 
 
     Mill Hill Vocabulary* 
 
     WAIS-III Information* 
 
 
 
29.89 (1.25) 
 
15.06 (.93) 
 
 
38.36 (1.19) 
 
18.10 (.88) 
 
*Age difference is significant at p ≤ .05 or better. 
 
 
Analyses 
Data were collected for nine contingency problems constructed from an 
orthogonal combination of three levels of conditional probability: .875, .500, and .125. 
These nine contingency problems measured five different contingencies (-.75, -.375, 0, 
.375, and .75), so the data for three problem-types (-.375, 0, and .375) were collapsed 
across contingency. Three primary dependent measures were collected or calculated for 
each of the five levels of programmed contingency. Of primary interest were the direct 
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contingency judgments given by participants (divided by 100). Second, the error 
associated with each judgment was obtained by finding the absolute difference between 
these judgments and the programmed contingencies: JE = |Cest – Cprog|. Third, derived 
contingency judgment scores were obtained for each contingency problem by subtracting 
the conditional probability estimates given by participants: ∆P = P(O/R) – P(O/~R). 
Outliers and missing data for contingency and conditional probability judgments for the 
nine problems were replaced by linear trend imputation after breaking the data into 
separate files by age group and condition. Overall, less than 5 percent (4.5%) of the data 
was altered by this method. A 2 (Age: young vs. older) x 2 (Generation Time (TG): short 
vs. long) x 2 (Memory Time (TM): short vs. long) x 5 (Contingency: -.75, -.375, 0, .375, 
.75) mixed-factorial analyses of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for judgment error 
and direct and derived contingency judgments. Trend analyses for the reliable main and 
interaction effects of contingency were also conducted for direct and derived contingency 
judgments. A criterion value of p ≤ .05 was used for all analyses, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
Response Probability 
 Constraining the time interval during which participants could make a response 
(TG) was intended to limit over-responding during the longer R-O interval conditions in 
order to provide a more effective test of the effects of a short versus long time to process 
a causal event. However, it is possible that, due to age-related changes in motor 
responding, some older adults in the short TG condition were less able to generate a 
response and thus less effectively sampled P(O/R). To evaluate motor response patterns 
for both age groups in all conditions, the probability of responding was calculated for 
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each contingency problem for each participant (total number of responses made / 60 total 
trials), and these data were submitted to a 2 (Age) x 2 (TM) x 2 (TG) x 5 (Contingency 
Problem) mixed-factorial ANOVA. No significant effects were found [Contingency, F(4, 
352) = 1.65, MSE = .01 , η2 = .02; Age x Contingency, F(4, 352) = 1.99, MSE = .01 , η2 = 
.02; Age x TM, F(1, 88) = 2.06, MSE = .11 , η2 = .02; TG x TM x Contingency, F(4, 352) = 
1.95, MSE = .01 , η2 = .02; Age x TG x TM x Contingency, F(4, 352) = 1.52, MSE = .01 , 
η2 = .02; all others, F < 1]. Thus, there was no difference in response probability for 
young and older adults for either the short or long generation time (TG) conditions. 
Direct Contingency Judgments 
Figure 8 shows participants’ direct contingency judgments in the four timing 
conditions at each level of programmed contingency. As depicted, young and older 
participants were able to discriminate the five contingencies, F(4, 352) = 144.36, MSE = 
.11, η2 = .62. The linear trend of this reliable main effect of contingency was significant, 
F(1, 88) = 254.61, MSE = .26, η2 = .74, showing that participants judged contingencies 
much like the nominal programmed contingencies. However, even though participants 
across both age groups discriminated the contingencies, significant age differences were 
found in this ability, F(1, 88) = 8.65, MSE = .12, η2 = .09, with older adults’ overall 
judgments more positive than young adults’ judgments. Moreover, this main effect of age 
was qualified by a significant Age x Contingency interaction, F(4, 352) = 5.03, MSE = 
.11, η2 = .05. The linear trend for this interaction was also significant, F(1, 88) = 8.75, 
MSE = .26, η2 = .09, confirming that the slope of the contingency judgment function was 
steeper for young adults than for older adults. Subsequent tests of simple effects revealed 
that, in particular, older adults gave higher judgments for the negative contingencies       
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(-.75, M = -.28, SE = .07; -.375, M = -.01, SE = .04) and zero contingency (M = .10, SE = 
.03) than did young adults (-.75, M = -.57, SE = .07; -.375, M = -.18, SE = .04; 0, M = -
.02, SE = .03) [-.75, F(1, 94) = 7.99, MSE = .25; -.375, F(1, 94) = 8.42, MSE = .08; 0, 
F(1, 94) = 11.07, MSE = .03], whereas both age groups rated the positive contingencies 
similarly [.375, F(1, 94) < 1; .75, F(1, 94) = 1.09, MSE = .18]. 
Direct contingency judgments were also affected by task timing conditions. There 
was no main effect of generation time (TG), F(1, 88) < 1, MSE = .12, η2 = .15, nor any 
interaction with this timing condition variable alone [Age x TG , F(1, 88) < 1, MSE = .12, 
η2 = .01; TG x CJ, F(4, 352) < 1, MSE = .12, η2 = .01; TG x TM, F(1, 88) = 3.24, MSE = 
.12, η2 = .04, p = .08; Age x TG x CJ, F(4, 352) < 1, MSE = .11, η2 = .01]. However, the 
Age x TG x TM interaction was significant, F(1, 88) = 5.32, MSE = .12, η2 = .06. To 
examine this interaction further, tests of simple interactions were conducted for each age 
group. Young adults showed no significant effect of TG x TM condition, F(1, 88) < 1. 
Instead, the Age x TG x TM interaction was driven by the significant TG x TM interaction 
for the older adults, F(1, 88) = 8.46, MSE = .12. Tests of simple effects revealed that, for 
older adults in the TM–short condition, judgments were not significantly different for the 
TG–short (M = .25, SE = .05) than for the TG-long condition (M = .13, SE = .06), F(1, 88) 
= 3.70, MSE = .12. In contrast, for older adults in the TM–long condition, judgments were 
significantly higher for the TG–long (M = .18, SE = .06) than for the TG-short condition 
(M = .04, SE = .05), F(1, 88) = 4.79, MSE = .12. Thus, the effects of generation time 
worked in conjunction with those of temporal contiguity to affect older adults’ judgments 
differently from young adults. Although judgments collapsed across contingency were 
closer to zero for older adults in the TG–short/TM–long condition and more positive in the 
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TG–short/TM–short condition, it is difficult to determine whether these higher average 
judgments were due to less accurate (and thus more positive) judgments for the negative 
contingencies or to more accurate (and thus more positive) judgments for the positive 
contingencies. This effect of condition did not interact with contingency [TG x TM x 
Contingency, F(4, 352) = 1.14, MSE = .11, η2 = .01; Age x TG x TM x Contingency, F(4, 
352) < 1, MSE = .11, η2 = .00]. 
No main effect of temporal contiguity (TM) was observed, F(1, 88) = 1.62, MSE = 
.12, η2 = .02, but this variable interacted with contingency, F(4, 352) = 8.45, MSE = .11, 
η2 = .09. The linear trend of contingency varied for the two levels of TM, F(1, 88) = 8.75, 
MSE = .26, η2 = .13, confirming that the slope of the contingency judgment function was 
more pronounced for participants in the TM-short conditions compared to participants in 
the TM-long conditions. No Age x TM interaction was found, F(1, 88) = 1.87, MSE = .12, 
η2 = .02, but an Age x TM x Contingency interaction was observed, F(4, 352) = 2.55, 
MSE = .11, η2 = .03, suggesting that the effect of temporal contiguity on contingency 
judgment varied for young and older adults. The linear trend for this interaction was 
significant, F(1, 88) = 3.91, MSE = .26, η2 = .04. To investigate this interaction further, 
tests of simple interactions were conducted for each age group. For young adults, the TM 
x Contingency interaction was significant, F(4, 184) = 10.79, MSE = .10. Tests of simple 
effects indicated that, for young adults, TM had the greatest effect on the strong ±.75 
contingencies. Specifically, young adults in the TM–long condition underestimated these 
contingencies compared to those in the TM–short condition [-.75, F(1, 46) = 13.63, MSE 
= .20 (TM–long, M = -.33, SE = .09; TM–short, M = -.81, SE = .09); .75, F(1, 46) = 13.11, 
MSE = .11 (TM–long, M = .52, SE = .09; TM–short, M = .86, SE = .09); .375, F(1, 46) = 
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2.93, MSE = .06; All other F’s < 1]. In contrast, for older adults, the TM x Contingency 
interaction was not significant, F(4, 184) = 1.18, MSE = .12, indicating that contingency 
judgments were similar for older adults given either a short or long R-O interval between 
events.  
To test whether young and older adults’ judgments differed from each other given 
a short or long TM condition, tests of Age x Contingency simple interactions were 
conducted for each level of the TM. The Age x Contingency interaction was significant 
for the TM-short condition, F(4, 184) = 10.49, MSE = .08. Subsequent tests of simple 
effects revealed age differences for the -.75, F(1, 46) = 25.83, MSE = .11, -.375, F(1, 46) 
= 8.60, MSE = .08, 0, F(1, 46) = 6.87, MSE = .04, and .75, F(1, 46) = 5.56, MSE = .09, 
contingency levels [.375, F(1, 46) < 1]. In contrast, an Age x Contingency interaction did 
not reach significance for the TM-long condition, F(4, 184) < 1. Thus, young and older 
adults gave different judgments given a short R-O interval, particularly for the negative 
contingencies (-.75 and -.375) and the strong positive contingency (.75), with young 
adults’ judgments closer to accurate. Yet these age differences were not found with a 
long R-O interval.  
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Figure 8. Young and older adults’ mean direct contingency judgments by task timing 
condition as a function of programmed R-O contingency.  
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Contingency Judgment Error
Contingency judgment error data are shown in Figure 9. Analyses of these data 
revealed a significant main effect of contingency, F(4, 352) = 13.31, MSE = .06, η2 = .13, 
showing that participants had greater error for some contingency problems than for 
others. Furthermore, a main effect of age, F(1, 88) = 7.18, MSE = .09, η2 = .08, showed 
that older adults had greater error in their contingency judgments than young adults. 
These findings align with those found for direct contingency judgments. 
No significant findings were observed for generation time (TG), F(1, 88) = 1.06, 
MSE = .09, η2 = .01, nor for any interactions with TG [Age x TG, F(1, 88) < 1, MSE = .09, 
η2 = .00; TG x Contingency, F(4, 352) < 1, MSE = .06, η2 = .01; Age x TG x Contingency, 
F(4, 352) < 1, MSE = .06, η2 = .01; TG x TM, F(1, 88) < 1, MSE = .09, η2 = .00; Age x TG 
x TM, F(1, 88) < 1, MSE = .09, η2 = .00; TG x TM x Contingency, F(4, 352) < 1, MSE = 
.06, η2 = .01; Age x TG x TM x Contingency, F(4, 352) = 1.46, MSE = .06, η2 = .02]. 
Thus, the effect of TG x TM condition found for older adults’ contingency judgments was 
not corroborated when using absolute deviation (judgment error) scores as the dependent 
variable.  
The main effect of temporal contiguity (TM) was significant, F(1, 88) = 6.63, MSE 
= .09, η2 = .07, but this effect was qualified by an Age x TM interaction, F(1, 88) = 4.15, 
MSE = .09, η2 = .05, and a TM x Contingency interaction, F(4, 352) = 8.28, MSE = .06, η2 
= .09. The Age x Contingency interaction was not significant, F(4, 352) = 2.05, MSE = 
.06, η2 = .02, p = .09, but there was again a three-way Age x TM x Contingency 
interaction, F(4, 352) = 2.05, MSE = .06, η2 = .04.  
 
 47
 
 
Follow-up tests of TM x Contingency simple interactions for each age group were 
conducted to further examine the Age x TM x Contingency interaction. For young adults, 
the TM x Contingency interaction was significant, F(4, 184) = 15.19, MSE = .04, and tests 
of simple effects revealed that judgment error was significantly lower in the short TM 
condition than in the long TM condition for all but the weak ±.375 contingencies [-.75, 
F(1, 46) = 18.38, MSE = .12; -.375, F(1, 46) < 1, MSE = .02; 0, F(1, 46) = 6.22, MSE = 
.04; .375, F(1, 46) = 3.13, MSE = .01; .75, F(1, 46) = 18.20, MSE = .05]. For older adults, 
the TM x Contingency interaction was not significant, F(4, 184) = 1.47, MSE = .08.  
Tests of Age x Contingency simple interactions for each TM condition revealed 
age differences for the short TM condition, F(4, 184) = 6.99, MSE = .04, but not for the 
long TM condition, F(4, 184) < 1, MSE = .08. Analyses of simple effects revealed that the 
age differences in the TM-short condition were driven in particular by increased error for 
the older adults in all but the zero contingency problems [-.75, F(1, 46) = 19.14, MSE = 
.07; -.375, F(1, 46) = 10.09, MSE = .04; 0, F(1, 46) = 1.95, MSE = .05; .375, F(1, 46) = 
4.56, MSE = .02; .75, F(1, 46) = 4.07, MSE = .05]. These findings indicate that the Age x 
TM x Contingency interaction found for contingency judgment error was driven by the 
improvement in young adults’ contingency judgments given a shorter R-O interval 
accompanied by no significant difference in older adults’ judgments given a short or long 
R-O interval. This finding mirrors that found for young and older adults’ direct 
contingency judgments. 
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Figure 9. Young and older adults’ mean contingency judgment error by 
condition for each programmed R-O contingency. 
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Derived Contingency Judgments
 Derived contingency judgment data are depicted in Figure 10. Analyses of these 
data revealed a main effect of contingency, F(4, 352) = 121.71, MSE = .09, η2 = .58. The 
linear trend of this effect was significant, F(1, 88) = 194.60, MSE = .21, η2 = .69, 
showing that participants across the two age groups gave conditional probability 
judgments for each contingency problem that increased as a linear function of 
programmed R-O contingency. In contrast to the previous analyses, no main effect of age 
was observed, F(1, 88) < 1, MSE = .06, η2 = .00, showing that both young (M = .01, SE = 
.02) and older (M = .00, SE = .02) adults’ mean derived contingency judgments were 
highly symmetrical around zero. Therefore, older adults did not show a strong positive 
bias in contingency judgments when these were derived from their conditional 
probability judgments. However, age did interact with contingency, F(4, 352) = 3.52, 
MSE = .09, η2 = .04. The linear trend for this interaction was significant, F(1, 88) = 5.34, 
MSE = .21, η2 = .06, showing that the slope of the young adults’ derived contingency 
judgments was steeper than that of the older adults. Notably, both negative and positive 
derived contingency judgments were closer to zero for older adults than for young adults, 
suggesting that the difference between the two conditional probability estimates was 
smaller for older adults than for young adults in the contingent problems. 
Age differences were observed for the task timing manipulations as well. No main 
effect of generation time (TG), F(1, 88) = 1.64, MSE = .09, η2 = .02, nor any two-way 
interactions with TG, were observed [Age x TG, F(1, 88) < 1, MSE = .09, η2 = .00; TG x 
Contingency, F(4, 352) = 2.15, MSE = .09, η2 = .02, p = .08; TG x TM, F(1, 88) < 1, MSE 
= .09, η2 = .00]. However, there was a three-way Age x TG x Contingency interaction, 
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F(4, 352) = 3.36, MSE = .09, η2 = .04. The linear trend for this interaction was 
significant, F(1, 88) = 4.72, MSE = .21, η2 = .05. To investigate this interaction further, 
tests of simple TG x Contingency interactions were conducted for each age group. A 
significant TG x Contingency interaction was found for young adults, F(4, 184) = 4.41, 
MSE = .09, but not for older adults, F(4, 184) < 1, MSE = .10. Subsequent tests of simple 
effects confirmed that young adults in the TG–short condition had derived contingency 
judgments further from zero for the -.75 contingency problem (M = -.59, SE = .08) than 
those in the TG–long condition (M = -.36, SE = .08), F(1, 46) = 4.06, MSE = .16; young 
adults in the TG–short condition also had derived contingency judgments further from 
zero for the .75 contingency problem (M = .65, SE = .08) than those in the TG–long 
condition (M = .38, SE = .08), F(1, 46) = 5.94, MSE = .15. Furthermore, in the TG–short 
condition young adults had significantly different derived contingency judgments than 
older adults, F(4, 184) = 5.35, MSE = .10, but in the TG–long condition no age 
differences were found,  F(4, 184) < 1. Tests of simple effects revealed that the 
differences were again in the ±.75 conditions [-.75, F(1, 46) = 5.46, MSE = .17; -.375, 
F(1, 46) = 2.68, MSE = .05; 0, F(1, 46) < 1; .375, F(1, 46) = 2.59, MSE = .07; .75, F(1, 
46) = 4.38, MSE = .21]. 
No main effect of temporal contiguity (TM) was observed, F(1, 88) = 3.53, MSE = 
.09, η2 = .04, p = .06, but a significant TM x Contingency interaction was found, F(4, 352) 
= 8.26, MSE = .09, η2 = .09. The linear trend for this interaction was significant, F(1, 88) 
= 13.24, MSE = .21, η2 = .13, showing that, as for direct contingency judgments, the 
contingency function slope was steeper for participants in the TM–short condition than for 
those in the TM–long condition. As for judgment error scores, but unlike direct 
 
 51
 
 
contingency judgments, the Age x TM interaction was significant, F(1, 88) = 4.86, MSE = 
.09, η2 = .05. Follow-up tests of simple effects revealed that young and older adults in the 
TM-short condition gave different derived contingency judgments than those in the TM–
long condition [Young, F(4, 352) = 5.76, MSE = .09; Older, F(4, 352) = 2.97, MSE = 
.09]. However, follow-up analyses of simple effects showed no significant age 
differences for either the TM–short condition, F(4, 352) = 2.72, MSE = .09, or the TM–
long condition, F(4, 352) = 1.25, MSE = .09. Unlike both direct judgments and judgment 
error, the Age x TM x Contingency interaction was not significant, F(4, 352) < 1, MSE = 
.09, η2 = .01.  
The three-way Age x TG x TM interaction was not significant, F(1, 88) < 1, MSE = 
.09, η2 = .01, but there was a three-way TG x TM x Contingency interaction, F(4, 352) = 
2.46, MSE = .09, η2 = .03. Follow-up tests of simple TM x Contingency interactions for 
each level of TG were conducted to further investigate this three-way interaction. A 
significant TM x Contingency interaction was found for the TG-short condition, F(4, 184) 
= 8.36, MSE = .10, but not for the TG-long condition F(4, 184) = 1.53, MSE = .08. 
Subsequent tests of simple effects revealed that, for the TG-short condition, there were 
differences between TM-short and TM-long for the -.75, F(1, 46) = 7.96, MSE = .16, .375, 
F(1, 46) = 8.41, MSE = .07, and .75, F(1, 46) = 7.83, MSE = .20, contingencies [all other 
F’s < 1]. Compared to participants in the TM-short condition, participants in the TM-long 
condition rated these contingencies closer to zero. The Age x TG x TM x Contingency 
interaction was not significant, F(4, 352) < 1, MSE = .09, η2 = .00, indicating that this 
effect of TG/TM condition on contingency was not different for the two age groups. 
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Figure 10. Young and older adults’ mean derived contingency judgments by condition 
for each programmed R-O contingency. 
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Density Bias
Previous research has found young adult participants’ direct contingency 
judgments to be biased based on the overall probability of an outcome occurring, in that 
judgments of programmed non-contingencies are higher when the probability of an 
outcome given a response (P(O/R)) is higher (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1980; Chatlosh et al., 
1985; but see Wasserman et al., 1983). To address the question of whether there was a 
density bias in the present data, and to examine whether this effect varied for young and 
older adults and for the different timing manipulations, data for the three noncontingent 
problems (P(O/R) / P(O/~R) = .875/.875, .500/.500, .125/.125) were submitted to a 2 
(Age) x 2 (TM) x 2 (TG) x 3 (Outcome Density) ANOVA.  
The results, presented in Table 2, showed that participants were indeed influenced 
by how often an outcome occurred. Even though the programmed contingency was the 
same for the three noncontingent problems, participants gave these problems significantly 
different contingency ratings, F(2, 176) = 37.59, MSE = .13, η2 = .30. Contrast analyses 
showed that these contingency judgments followed a pattern like that of the overall 
outcome probability—the .875/.875 problem (M = .26, SE = .04) was rated significantly 
higher than the .500/.500 problem (M = .05, SE = .03), F(1, 88) = 21.19, MSE = .21, η2 = 
.19, which was significantly higher than the .125/.125 problem (M = -.19, SE = .04), F(1, 
88) = 27.17, MSE = .21, η2 = .24. Thus, for both young and older adults, the greater the 
probability of an outcome, the higher contingency was rated, even when there was 
actually no relation between the events at all. Interestingly, this effect of outcome density 
was qualified by an Age x TG x Outcome Density interaction, F(2, 176) = 3.55, MSE = 
.13, η2 = .04. To investigate this interaction further, analyses of TG x Outcome Density 
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interaction effects were conducted for each age group. The interaction was not significant 
for young adults, F(2, 92) < 1, but was significant for older adults, F(2, 92) = 3.64, MSE 
= .14. Subsequent tests of simple effects revealed that older adults in the TG-long 
condition judged the .125/.125 non-contingent problem as more negative (M = -.24, SE = 
.06) than those in the TG-short condition (M = .02, SE = .06), F(1, 46) = 8.59, MSE = .09. 
Finally, there was a main effect of temporal contiguity (TM), F(1, 88) = 3.97, MSE = .03, 
η2 = .04, showing that participants in the TM–short condition rated the zero contingencies 
higher (M = .08, SE = .03) than those in the TM–long condition (M = .00, SE = .03). This 
finding is consistent with the previously discussed effects of TM condition. 
Table 2 
 
Density Bias for Young and Older Adults 
 
 
 
TG-short 
 
TG-long 
 
TM-short TM-long TM-short TM-long 
Young 
      
          .875/.875 
      
          .500/.500 
 
          .125/.125 
 
 
 
.25 (.12) 
 
-.05 (.06) 
 
-.44 (.09) 
 
 
.20 (.12) 
 
-.03 (.06) 
 
-.241 (.09) 
 
 
 
.37 (.11) 
 
.04 (.09) 
 
-.20 (.12) 
 
 
.00 (.11) 
 
.04 (.09) 
 
-.235 (.12) 
 
 
Older 
      
          .875/.875 
      
          .500/.500 
 
          .125/.125 
 
 
 
 
.31 (.12) 
 
.18 (.12) 
 
.04 (.12) 
 
 
 
.18 (.12) 
 
-.01 (.06) 
 
-.01 (.09) 
 
 
 
.40 (.11) 
 
.12 (.09) 
 
-.12 (.12) 
 
 
 
.40 (.11) 
 
.08 (.09) 
 
-.35 (.12) 
 
 
  
 
Chapter Five 
 
Discussion 
The goal of this study was to examine the differential effects of task timing 
manipulations on young and older adults’ contingency learning ability. This study used a 
response-outcome (R-O) contingency learning task in which participants were instructed 
to judge the extent to which a simple action caused an outcome occurrence. In particular, 
this study examined what happens to young and older adults’ contingency judgments 
with more or less stringent timing manipulations of the contingent events. Specifically, 
the time interval during which participants could generate a causal response (TG) was 
either short or long. And the time between the causal event and the outcome, during 
which the causal event must be held in memory (TM), was short or long. These timing 
manipulations were constructed to test the theory that the speed with which one can 
process information will affect associative learning (Salthouse, 1996; Wagner, 1981) and 
therefore contingency learning (Shanks, 1987). It was expected, because of slower 
processing speed associated with cognitive aging, that older adults would show less 
accurate contingency judgments than young adults, particularly in the less optimal task 
timing conditions. 
Direct Contingency Judgments 
The results corroborate previous findings that adult humans are able to accurately 
judge the relationships between contingent response-outcome events (e.g., Allen & 
Jenkins, 1980; Chatlosh et al., 1985; Wasserman et al., 1983; Wasserman et al., 1993). 
Like these previous studies, direct judgments of contingency closely paralleled the 
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programmed contingencies set up by the experimenter—positive contingencies were 
given higher judgments, and negative contingencies were given lower judgments. 
Furthermore, this important learning ability was shown to be affected by aging, also in 
keeping with previous research (e.g., Chasseigne et al., 1997; Mutter & Pliske, 1996; 
Mutter & Williams, 2004; Parr & Mercier, 1998). In particular, and as in previous 
studies, the difference between young and older adults’ contingency judgments occurred 
primarily for the negative contingency relationships in which the causal response 
prevented the outcome occurrence. Even though older adults were able to judge positive 
contingencies relatively accurately, much like young adults, some deficit associated with 
aging was unique to the learning of negatively contingent events.   
Although not precisely in the hypothesized direction, task timing conditions did 
affect young and older adults’ contingency judgments differently in this study. First, 
young and older adults’ overall direct contingency judgments were differentially 
impacted by combining response generation time and R-O interval manipulations. In the 
current study, contingencies were symmetrical around zero; thus, overall judgment scores 
that are closer to zero indicate more accurate contingency estimation. Young adults’ 
overall estimates were unaffected by the combination of these conditions, whereas older 
adults showed a positive bias in their contingency judgments. This positive bias was 
particularly evident for older adults when given a long versus a short generation time in 
conjunction with a long R-O interval. 
Despite this evidence for age differences in the different response generation and 
R-O timing conditions, generation time (TG) generally did not have a strong effect on 
young and older adults’ contingency learning. Varying the time interval during which 
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participants could generate a response was intended to test the effects of the limited time 
mechanism of processing speed (e.g., Salthouse, 1996) on the contingency learning 
ability of older adults. In particular, it was hypothesized that providing a short time to 
generate a response would limit processing of the causal event for older participants with 
slower processing speed, thereby impeding contingency learning. No differences were 
found for young or older adults based on this timing manipulation alone, and the only 
difference observed for older adults was in the long versus short generation time 
condition in conjunction with a long memory time. Thus, the data suggest that the limited 
time mechanism of processing speed may not have a significant impact on the 
contingency learning ability of older adults.  
However, before discarding this mechanism of Salthouse’s (1996) theory, it 
seems prudent to examine the task used to test this theory. A potential limitation in this 
study’s ability to test the limited time mechanism may have been the R-O paradigm used. 
In order to examine causal contingencies, in which one estimated the extent to which his 
or her behavior affected an outcome event, a motor response had to be made. In order to 
do so, it was necessary to allow enough time for both young and older adults to generate 
a response. However, allowing a full 750 msec for a response in a condition supposed to 
stress sensory processing ability might still not have sufficiently impeded stimulus 
processing. After all, the causal stimulus had certainly been processed enough for a motor 
response to be generated. Thus, the limited time mechanism may not have been fully 
tested in this study. In order to further investigate the possibility that limiting the time to 
process the first event impedes its association with a contingent event, future research 
might use a cue-outcome (C-O) contingency paradigm requiring passive observation of 
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events without a required response. In this way, stimuli could be presented even more 
quickly and slower processors’ sensory representations would be more likely to be 
differentially fragile. 
The TM manipulation used in this study demonstrated that contingency judgments 
were affected by increasing the amount of time between the response and outcome 
events. As predicted, this memory time manipulation affected the direct contingency 
judgments and judgment error of both young and older adults. The finding that reduced 
temporal contiguity of contingent events affects young adults’ contingency learning 
corroborates previous research (e.g., Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989; but see also 
Chatlosh, et al., 1985), in that young adults tended to underestimate contingent 
relationships given a longer R-O interval. However, in contrast to predictions, the effect 
of age was not due to an improvement in older adults’ contingency judgments given the 
more optimal short R-O interval but rather to the decrease in young adults’ contingency 
judgment accuracy given the less optimal long R-O interval. Interestingly, these findings 
parallel the free operant task findings of Mutter and Williams (2004), for which the age 
differences found in short versus long R-O interval conditions were due not to the 
hypothesized improvement in older adults’ judgments given a short R-O interval but 
rather to the decline in young adults’ judgments given a long R-O interval. In fact, in both 
that study and the current research, young adults’ performance in the long R-O condition 
was much like that of older adults.   
The finding that young adults given a short R-O interval gave more accurate 
contingency judgments than those given a long R-O interval also suggests that temporal 
contiguity is important to contingency learning. This explanation lends support for the 
 
 59
 
 
simultaneity mechanism of processing speed tested in the current study, in that the short 
R-O interval promoted overlapping memory activations for the causal and outcome 
events, whereas the long R-O interval lessened the overlap of memory activations.  
Also interesting, however, is the finding that young adults given a long R-O 
interval gave similar judgments to older adults in both R-O interval conditions. 
Comparing judgment patterns of the two age groups in the short R-O interval conditions 
may aid understanding as to what cognitive changes associated with aging might be 
related to less accurate contingency judgment ability. It is possible that the lessened 
overlap of events in young adults’ working memory given a long R-O interval is 
effectively similar to the overlap of events in older adults’ working memory even given a 
short R-O interval. In other words, the simultaneity mechanism of processing speed may 
affect older adults to the extent that even more temporally contiguous events are less able 
to be simultaneously activated in working memory, and thus are less able to be associated 
into an accurate contingency judgment (e.g., Salthouse, 1996; Wagner, 1981). In this 
sense, this study found support for a link between processing speed and contingency 
learning. This fundamental deficit in associative learning with aging is corroborated with 
research such as that of Mitchell and colleagues (2000), who have shown an age-related 
deficit in the ability to accurately associate the individual features of an event. Thus, 
older adults may be less able to perceptually bind the component features of a contingent 
relationship. That and the current research align with the idea that there is a deficit in 
older adults’ ability to judge contingency that cannot be eased by improving the external 
timing of events. 
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Derived Contingency Judgments 
This study also confirmed that derived judgments of contingency based on 
conditional probability judgments (i.e., the probability of an outcome when a response is 
given and the probability of the outcome when a response is not made) are sensitive to 
contingency. Participants gave conditional probability judgments that differed as a 
function of programmed R-O contingency.   
Derived contingency judgments showed effects of response generation time that 
differed somewhat from those seen for direct contingency judgments. For derived 
contingency judgments, young adults given a short generation time gave more accurate 
estimates for the strong ±.75 contingencies than young adults given a long generation 
time and older adults in either generation time condition. Older adults given either a short 
or long generation time showed no difference in their derived contingency judgments. 
This outcome did not support the expectation that young adults would show no difference 
in judgments based on generation time, but rather that older adults’ judgments would be 
less accurate given a short than a long time to generate a response. Instead, the observed 
age differences resulted from an improvement in young adults’ judgments in what was 
hypothesized to be the less optimal timing situation, rather than to a deficit in older 
adults’ judgments given the same timing situation. However, because a similar outcome 
was not found for direct contingency judgments or for judgment error, perhaps the 
generation time effect for young adults is unique to their judgments of P(O/R) and 
P(O/~R) when the programmed difference between these conditional probabilities is 
greatest. It is possible that a short generation time for young adults, who have a faster 
processing speed, allowed even better overlap of memory activation for the response and 
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outcome events, particularly for a problem situation requiring less memory demand like 
conditional probability estimation (as opposed to direct estimation of contingency). In 
such a case, the short generation time, hypothesized to be the least optimal condition, 
may have actually been the most optimal, and older adults simply did not show 
improvement in judgments regardless of condition. 
In addition, participants given a short generation time in conjunction with a short 
R-O interval had more accurate derived contingency judgments for the strong ±.75 
contingencies than those given a short generation time with a long R-O interval. No 
differences were found for those given a long generation time or for age group. Again, 
perhaps a shorter time to generate a response was actually more beneficial to the 
perception of strong contingency relationships than hypothesized, because it actually 
facilitated the learning of the association between the response or context with the 
ensuing outcome. 
Direct versus Derived Contingency Judgments 
Of greater interest is the difference in the effect of generation time in conjunction 
with temporal contiguity found between direct and derived contingency judgments. This 
is primarily because age differences associated with both timing conditions were found 
only for direct contingency judgments; thus, this finding indicates that the effects of task 
timing condition on contingency judgments corresponding to aging are more pronounced 
when direct judgments of contingency are required. Previous research has suggested that 
conditional probability judgments may be simpler to make than contingency judgments, 
particularly if subjective estimate of these probability estimates are somehow used to 
calculate contingency (see Wasserman et al., 1993). Moreover, it is possible that the 
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cognitive mechanisms required for simple associative learning between a target event in 
addition to the context and the outcome, as well as learning the association between the 
context alone and the outcome (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), are less affected by 
slower processing speed in older adults than using these sources of information to make a 
direct estimate of the relationship between contingent events (e.g., Shanks, 1987). 
Conclusion 
 Overall, these findings again demonstrate that contingency learning ability is 
affected by cognitive aging. Furthermore, by investigating how the ability to judge 
contingency is affected by different task timing conditions, the current study provides 
new information about what factors are important to learning causal relationships. Of 
greatest interest was the finding that older adults did not give improved contingency 
judgments even in theoretically optimal task timing conditions. Furthermore, while young 
adults’ judgments looked much like those of older adults’ in the theoretically less optimal 
timing conditions, their judgments improved in the more optimal conditions. The results 
of the current study lend support for a processing speed theory of contingency learning, 
although future research is needed to fully investigate this explanation. Older adults’ 
reduced ability to judge contingent relationships in the environment may be due to a 
fundamental deficit in the ability to associate or bind the events simultaneously in 
working memory.  
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Appendix A 
Derived Contingencies 
 
  P(O/R) 
  .875 .500 .125 
P(O/~R) .875 0 -.375 -.750 
 .500 .375 0 -.375 
 .125 .750 .375 0 
 
 
 
Experiment Instructions 
 
(Adapted from Mutter & Williams, 2004) 
 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. Take as much time as you 
like and ask as many questions as you like.  
Your task in this experiment is to judge the extent to which you can cause 
something to happen on the computer screen. On each trial you will see a triangle above a 
series of boxes that looks like this: 
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Your task is to find out whether pressing the SPACEBAR has any effect on 
whether or not the triangle flashes. Now press the SPACEBAR and see what happens 
[the triangle flashed when the SPACEBAR was pressed]. The triangle flashes. 
Sometimes the triangle will flash of its own accord, like this: [the triangle automatically 
flashed three times].  
During each trial, you must decide whether to press or not press the SPACEBAR. 
Now look at the boxes on the bottom of the screen. These boxes provide information 
about the amount of time you have in a trial to make your decision about whether to press 
or not press the SPACEBAR. At the beginning of each trial the boxes will appear filled 
and will count down one by one to indicate the amount of time remaining for your 
decision. If you decide to press the SPACEBAR, you must press it within this time 
period. If you decide not to press the spacebar, you simply do nothing during this time 
period. Now press the RIGHT ARROW key to see what the boxes will do [The boxes all 
turned black and emptied back to white, one by one, from right to left. The short 
generation time condition had five boxes on the bottom of the screen; the long generation 
time had 15 smaller boxes on the bottom of the screen. In both conditions, a box emptied 
every 150 ms.].  
In order to make accurate estimates, it is to your advantage to press the 
SPACEBAR some of the time and not press it some of the time. In addition, because your 
task is to find out whether pressing the SPACEBAR has any affect on the triangle, please 
DO NOT HOLD DOWN THE SPACEBAR at any time during the experiment. 
You will be given a practice problem then nine different problems. The 
relationship between pressing the SPACEBAR and whether or not the triangle flashes 
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will not change within each problem, but may well vary from one problem to the next. 
Therefore, it is very important that you not let your judgment on any given problem affect 
your judgment on any of the other problems. In other words, treat each problem as if it is 
a new problem. 
After each of the problems is completed, you will be asked to evaluate the 
relationship between pressing the SPACEBAR and the illumination of the triangle, based 
on your experience over the course of the entire problem. You will make your judgment 
using a scale from –100 and +100. +100 indicates that pressing the SPACEBAR always 
causes the triangle to flash,–100 indicates that pressing the SPACEBAR always prevents 
the triangle from flashing, and 0 indicates that pressing the SPACEBAR has no effect on 
whether or not the triangle flashes. 
You will then be asked to suppose you see a new screen with the triangle outline, 
and you PRESS THE SPACEBAR. You will be asked to estimate the probability that the 
triangle would flash, based on your experiences during the problem you just finished. 
You will type in a number to indicate your estimate of this probability, based on the scale 
shown below. Note that the scale ranges from 0% to 100%. The value 0% means the 
triangle definitely would not flash when you press the SPACEBAR. The value 50% 
means the triangle is as likely to flash as to not flash (50/50 chance). And the value 100% 
means the triangle definitely would flash when you press the SPACEBAR.  
You will then be asked to imagine you see a new screen with the triangle outline, 
and you DO NOT PRESS THE SPACEBAR. You will be asked to estimate the 
probability that the triangle would flash, based on your experiences during the problem 
you just finished. You will type in a number to indicate your estimate of this probability, 
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based on the scale shown below. Note that the scale ranges from 0% to 100%. The value 
0% means the triangle definitely would not flash when you press the SPACEBAR. The 
value 50% means the triangle is as likely to flash as to not flash (50/50 chance). And the 
value 100% means the triangle definitely would flash when you press the SPACEBAR..  
You will be able to take as much time as you need when making your judgments. 
Because judgment accuracy is VERY important, you will earn $0.25 for each accurate 
estimate you make (for a total of $2.25 EXTRA earnings possible).  
Do you have any questions before you start the practice problem? 
Please press the RETURN key when you are ready to begin the practice problem.  
[The remaining instructions appeared after the practice problem was completed]. 
Now you will begin the first problem. Feel free to take a short break in between 
problems. Because it is very important you understand what you are supposed to do, 
please ask the experimenter if you have any questions. If you do not have any questions, 
press the RETURN key to begin.  
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Appendix B 
 
Experiment Manipulations (all times are in milliseconds) 
 
 R = Response [R,~R] 
TG = Time to Generate R [short, long] 
TM = Time to Rehearse R in Memory [short, long] 
O = Outcome [P(O/R), P(O/~R)] 
  
TMTG 
 
O -----R----  
 
1. Testing the Limited Time Mechanism: Short vs. Long Generation Time (TG) 
 
     a. Short Generation Time (TG-ShortTM-Short) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     b. Long Generation Time (TG-LongTM-Short) 
TG=2500 
- - - - R - - - - - TM=1000 
O 
 - R- -  TM=1000 
O 
TG=750 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Testing the Simultaneity Mechanism: Long vs. Short Time in Memory (TM) 
 
    c.  Long Memory Time (TG-LongTM-Long) 
 
 
 
TG=2500  
 
 
 
 
     d. Short Memory Time (TG-LongTM-Short) 
- - - - - R - - - -  
O 
TM=4000 
 
 
- - - - - R - - - -  
TM=1000 
O 
TG=2500 
 
 
